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The Game You Are in: Misleading through 
Social Norms and What’s Wrong with It
Abstract This paper discusses the phenomenon of misleading about “the game 
you are in.” Individuals who mislead others in this way draw on the fact that we 
rely on social norms for regulating the levels of alertness, openness, and trust we 
use in different epistemic situations. By pretending to be in a certain game with 
a certain epistemic situation, they can entice others to reveal information or to 
exhibit low levels of alertness, thereby acting against their own interests. I delineate 
this phenomenon from direct lies and acts of misleading by implication, and 
discuss some variations of it. I then ask why and under what conditions it is morally 
wrong to mislead others about the game they are in. I distinguish three normative 
angles for understanding the phenomenon: deontological constraints, free-riding 
on a shared cultural infrastructure, and implicit discrimination against outsiders 
and atypical candidates. I conclude by briefly discussing some practical implications.
Keywords: epistemic situations, lying, misleading, social norms
1 Introduction
This paper discusses the phenomenon of misleading about “the game one is 
in.” It occurs when one party in a social interaction, A, implies, by drawing 
on established social norms, that this interaction is a certain epistemic sit-
uation for which certain degrees of alertness and trust are appropriate, al-
though this is not the game she actually plays. By doing so, she puts the other 
party, B, at a disadvantage in the epistemic processes that take place between 
them. It is because human communication is embedded in social contexts 
that one can mislead others not only by violating epistemic norms, such as 
the norm of truthfulness, but also by violating social norms. 
Consider the following example, which is atypical in its simplicity, but there-
fore helpful as an illustration. An engineer, Anne, is in negotiations with an-
other engineer, Bert, from a different company. They discuss a deal about a 
new product that their companies might develop together. They agree that 
doing so would be profitable for both sides, but it is still open how the gains 
will be divided. Anne is keen to find out how large the other company’s bud-
get is: this would allow her to suggest a maximum price for her own compa-
ny’s contribution without putting the deal at risk. But during the first half 
of the negotiations, when they talk money, Bert is on guard not to reveal 
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this information, because he is aware of its strategic importance. Later in 
the day, however, they walk over to the test stand where the prototypes are 
mounted. They get excited about the project, and start a heated discussion 
about how to solve the remaining technical problems. Both being engineers, 
and given that there are strong social norms about cooperation among fel-
low engineers, they are used to having collegial conversation in which they 
share their expertise. At one point, Anne notes, in a casual tone: “Well, that 
solution might work, depending on how much money you’d want to spend 
on it.” In the heat of the moment, Bert readily reveals the information about 
his budget. Anne does not show any outward sign of triumph, but rather 
continues the technical discussion 
Anne got Bert to reveal important information by catching him when he was 
in a different frame of mind than that of “talking money.” Bert was relying 
on social norms about honesty and collegiality that apply to conversations 
among fellow engineers, but not to business negotiations. Anne blurred the 
boundaries between these two games, to her own advantage. Our intuitions 
about this case are likely to be torn between admiration for her shrewdness, 
and resentment towards the way in which she tricked Bert. My analysis will 
make clear why this is a borderline case, and why other instances of this phe-
nomenon are clearly morally wrong. 
This case is one instance of the broader phenomenon of morally question-
able forms of behavior that I describe as “misleading about the game.” This 
phenomenon has not yet been discussed in moral or political philosophy or 
social epistemology, although related themes have received some attention. 
Tamar Schapiro (2003) discusses a constellation that she calls the “sound and 
fury” problem, other people’s undermining a shared practice make one’s own 
actions change their meaning, so that one can become a “tool for evil;” for ex-
ample, what one participates in is not the practice of “law enforcement” but of 
“running a mafia.” Schapiro asks whether this can lead to situations in which 
moral agent are justified in not doing what would otherwise be their duty. 
One subgroup of cases of being misled about the game one is in are cases in 
which we think we participate in a shared practice, but the other party does 
not comply with its spirit. But the phenomenon is broader, and has distinc-
tive moral features of its own. It is also different from the cases of “epistemic 
injustice” that Miranda Fricker (2007) analyses, i.e. cases in which individuals 
are not granted full epistemic standing because of racial or sexist prejudices, 
or cases in which individuals lack the vocabulary to express moral wrongs 
done to them. While not knowing what game one is in can lead to similar 
experiences of discrimination and exclusion, it is a different phenomenon.
What misleading about the game has in common with these cases, however, is 
that it can only be understood if one takes seriously the social embeddedness 
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of human behavior, including communication. Human behavior is often high-
ly interdependent, and subtle differences in what others do can make a differ-
ence for one’s own reactions and for the normative evaluation of the situation. 
These nuances are hard to capture if one assumes a picture of human deci-
sion-making and agency that focuses exclusively on our rational capacities. 
But if one takes a realistic picture of how human beings react to social cues, for 
which there is good empirical evidence (see §4), we can see that there are forms 
of misleading that “rational man” would not succumb to, but that are nonethe-
less widespread and that raise complex moral, social, and political questions. 
In this paper I focus on one category of such cases, which I call “misleading 
about the game you are in.” In the next section, I clarify the notion of games 
and of the epistemic situations they create. I then discuss how one can mis-
lead others about the game they are in, and differentiate this phenomenon 
from lies and from misleading by implications, and explore a number of 
variations of the phenomenon. I distinguish three normative angles from 
which one can approach it. The duty to treat others with respect can explain 
some, but not all instances. A second possibility is to understand such forms 
of misleading as free-riding on a shared cultural infrastructure that is, on the 
whole, beneficial for the kinds of fallible creatures human beings are. Final-
ly, such cases can also be problematic because they can lead to implicit dis-
crimination against outsiders and atypical candidates. I conclude by briefly 
discussing some practical implications, both at the level of individual moral 
behavior and at a broader political level. 
2 Social games and epistemic situations 
Our interactions with others are socially embedded. In differentiated societ-
ies, they can fall into different social spheres in which different kinds of social 
interactions or “games,” governed by different sets of norms, take place. For 
example, among family members in good standing we expect trust, hones-
ty, and mutual support – we can “open up” before them. Among colleagues, 
we expect a certain degree of loyalty, but not necessarily complete openness 
about our private lives. Being a trusted, year-long business partner evokes 
different norms than entering into a one-off exchange. When one meets in 
court, it would be naive not to expect some degree of strategic communica-
tion. This is a fact of life, and while we may disagree about the moral qual-
ities of specific games, for example about the degree of adversarialness in 
legal interaction, the plurality of games as such is not morally problematic 
– or so I assume in what follows. 
The notion of “game” that I use to describe different kinds of interactions in 
different social spheres is, or course, a metaphorical notion. It nicely captures 
a number of aspects that are important for understanding the phenomenon 
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I am interested in. Games are something one plays together, and games have 
rules that everyone needs to know in order to participate. Nonetheless, many 
games also leave scope for individuals to make moves of their own within 
the framework of these rules. Playing a game skillfully means being able to 
move in ways that further one’s own interest or the interests of one’s team. 
Many games contain some degree of competitiveness, but it is considered 
unfair to break or bend the rules in order to outcompete others. These fea-
tures of games cohere nicely with the social interactions within which the 
phenomenon of “misleading about the game” can take place. A feature that 
coheres less well with this phenomenon is the fact that games are played for 
fun, and nothing serious is at stake. This can be case in the phenomenon of 
“misleading about the game,” and if so, the weight of moral wrongdoing can 
be diminished accordingly. But it is not true for all instances of this phenom-
enon. It can have a serious impact on the rights and the welfare of individ-
uals, for example when it takes place within job negotiations. 
Many theories of social differentiation conceive of the social realm as being 
cut up into different games, with “large chunks” of social life belonging to one 
game or another. But in real life these relations can be rather complex and 
hence difficult to navigate. Different games can overlap, or be part of more 
complex meta-games. The boundaries of games can be fuzzy. Some games 
include meta-rules about how to change the rules, others don’t. Sometimes, 
individuals are caught in roles that simultaneous belong to different games, 
and have to negotiate the relations between them. For example, in an eth-
nographic study of a tech company Kunda discusses the case of a married 
couple who both work for the same company. They have to go to consider-
able lengths to clarify their different roles as spouses and colleagues (1996, 
196f.). Economic relations, which are often more interest-driven than other 
social relations, are embedded in social relations (see e.g. Granovetter 1985), 
which can create tensions and conflicts between the roles individuals have 
within different games. 
Depending on the game we are in, different epistemic situations can arise. 
Epistemic situations are characterized by the norms that govern the epis-
temic processes in a social interaction. These norms usually flow from the 
broader norms governing the game within which the epistemic situation 
takes place. In a trustful relationship with a friend or lover, I expect open-
ness and fully rely on her testimony. It would be foolish to rely on the same 
standards in legal negotiations. When I ask a distant acquaintance how she 
likes my new neck tie, I should expect a polite phrase, not a truthful state-
ment of his opinion. The norms about what can be left unsaid without vio-
lating epistemic standards also vary depending on the game within which 
an epistemic situation takes place. We not only evaluate the epistemic acts 
of others, but also adapt our own levels of alertness, openness, and trust 
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depending on what we understand the epistemic situation to be. This is why 
it is usually1 advantageous to know what kind of game one is in: this allows 
us to understand how to approach the epistemic situation, and to participate 
in the relevant games on an equal footing. 
3 Misleading about the game 
In standard cases, the social norms of a game clearly signal which epistemic 
situation we find ourselves in. But individuals can benefit from misleading 
others about the game they are in, because this can give them an epistemic 
advantage. For example, the other party might behave more trustingly if she 
thinks that the game is a friendly collegial chat in which no strategic inter-
ests are at stake. By pretending to be in a different game, e.g. by blurring the 
boundaries of different game or by abruptly switching games, individuals 
can opportunistically exploit the tendency to adapt one’s epistemic stance 
to the game one takes oneself to be in. This can happen in face-to-face in-
teractions, as in the example of Anne and Bert, but also in more anonymous 
contexts, including online interactions.
In a job interview, the conversation can switch from the game of “will we hire 
you?” to the game of “we want to hire you – how much do we have to offer 
to make sure you’ll accept?” The epistemic situation changes accordingly: in 
the first game, it is unproblematic for applicants to signal their eagerness to 
receive an offer, whereas in the second game, it may be appropriate, and in-
deed necessary for defending one’s own interest, to communicate in a more 
strategic way, e.g. by not revealing that one does not have any alternative of-
fers. Hence, if the potential employer is not open about which game is being 
played, he is in an epistemically privileged position. Or take a conversation 
between a doctor and a patient about treatment options, which the patient 
takes to be one in which the doctor speaks as a medical expert with a profes-
sional responsibility, and hence fully trusts her judgment, while the doctor 
has her financial interests in mind. If the patient knew this, he could adapt 
his epistemic stance to a more skeptical attitude, questioning the usefulness 
of different therapies instead of blindly trusting the doctor. Some websites 
seem to practice a similar kind of misleading by pretending to be a differ-
ent kind of website than they actually are, e.g. services free of charger rather 
than subscription-based sites.
Such acts of misleading are different from direct lies, in which someone 
makes a statement that is contrary to what she knows to be the case. In most 
situations, lies are morally wrong, and there is a venerable philosophical 
1  There may be occasional exceptions, e.g. in the artistic realm, where the attraction 
of a game may stem from individuals not knowing what game it is. 
255
SOCIAL JUSTICE: NEW PERSPECTIVES, NEW HORIZONS 
tradition of discussing the question of whether or not they can be mor-
ally justified under certain conditions, e.g. in order to protect some other 
moral good. Often, lies are also forbidden by law and one can take legal ac-
tion against them if one has sufficient evidence. This is probably why many 
agents try to avoid direct lies – either because they genuinely care about 
not violating the norm not to lie, or because they fear the consequences of 
being caught – and resort to other forms of misleading instead. Misleading 
about the game, however, is also different from standard forms of mislead-
ing, which exploit the implications of what is being said.2 To cite an example 
used by Bernard Williams: if someone says “Someone has been opening your 
mail,” we usually do not expect the person to refer to herself as the one who 
opened the mail, although this possibility is, technically speaking, included 
in the set of individuals described by the term “someone” (2002, 96f.). Such 
forms of misleading do not come to us naturally: we have to think carefully 
about how to craft statements that are technically correct, but from which 
the other person will draw a wrong conclusion.3
What differentiates acts of misleading about the game one is in from lies and 
misleading by implication? Lies violate a core epistemic norm: the norm of 
truthfulness. Misleading by implication does not directly violate the norm 
of truthfulness, but rather violates linguistic norms about how we use cer-
tain terms. In both cases, the relevant norms are epistemic norms. If one 
misleads someone about the game that she is in, in contrast, one violates 
non-linguistic norms: social norms that signal to others which game is be-
ing played, and hence which epistemic situation they are in. This form of 
misleading would not be possible if epistemic processes were independent 
2  It is an old discussion in moral philosophy whether there are morally relevant dif-
ferences between lying and other forms of misleading (for a historical account see e.g. 
Williams 2002, 100ff.). In a recent account, Jennifer Saul has scrutinized various arguments 
that have been suggested for establishing such a difference (2012, chap. IV). Candidates 
that have been suggested include the more active role of listeners who draw a wrong 
inference, or the additional efforts it can take to mislead someone in this way. Saul rejects 
these arguments as insufficient: there are either counterexamples that prove them wrong, 
or they are not consistent with what we think makes a moral difference in other contexts. 
Often, she concludes, we mix up judgments about an agent’s characters with judgements 
about the act, and this leads to the impression that lying and misleading are morally 
different (ibid., 86ff.). Another approach, suggested by Webber (2014), is to ask what 
damage a lie and an act of misleading can do. If someone misleads another person, her 
trustworthiness with regard to the implications of her statements is damaged, but her 
trustworthiness with regard to the truth-value of statements – what Webber calls “cred-
ibility in assertion” – is kept intact; a lie, in contrast, damages both. 
3  Another variety of deceptions, which is already very close to misleading about the 
game one is in, is the use of non-verbal clues, such as packing a suitcase in order to sug-
gest that one has the intention to go on a journey (see e.g. Saul 2012, 75ff.; the example 
goes back to Kant). 
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of the social situations in which they take place (whereas we can understand 
lies and other forms of misleading independent of social context, at least up 
to a point). But given that different epistemic situations are part of differ-
ent social games, and given that human beings tend to adapt their epistem-
ic stance to these games, this form of misleading is possible. When one lies 
or misleads by implication, the deception takes place within the epistemic 
situation. When one misleads about the game, one ushers the other person 
into the wrong room, as it were, and once she has adopted the wrong epis-
temic stance, one can proceed without other forms of lying or misleading. 
To be sure, in many cases these different phenomena go together: once one 
has misled a person about the game she is in, it may be temptingly easy to 
also use misleading statements or even lies. But the example of Anne de-
scribed earlier shows that misleading about the game can also work on its 
own. Anne did nothing but ask an implicit question (“How high is your bud-
get?”) – which, not being a statement, cannot be a lie, and which can hard-
ly be reconstructed as a form misleading by implication, along the lines of 
“Someone has been opening your mail.” The act of misleading, if one wants to 
describe it as such, was not to ask the question, but rather to casually weave 
it into what Bert took to be a different epistemic situation. 
One can distinguish a number of different variations of this phenomenon, 
which are relevant for a normative evaluation. A first distinction can be 
drawn between catching others unaware drawing on genuine ignorance of rel-
evant social norms on the part of those who are misled. Living in a com-
plex world, and navigating different social spheres, human beings are used 
to relying on social norms in order to adapt their behavior to these spheres. 
When they are familiar with the rules of the games, this can happen more 
or less unthinkingly. We see certain cues or symbols that stand for a certain 
social sphere and automatically switch into a certain frame of mind. Psy-
chologists distinguish, as a metaphorical short-hand, between two modes 
of human cognition: “system 1 thinking” and “system 2 thinking.” System 1 
“operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of 
voluntary control” whereas system 2 is “slower, conscious, effortful, explic-
it, and more logical” (Kahneman 2011, 20-23). When operating in a “system 
1” mode, switching into the right mode for different games happens just as 
“automatically and quickly,” triggered by linguistic or other signals, almost 
below the level of conscious perception.
As psychologists have shown, certain words can have a “priming” effect on 
human beings: being exposed to them influences our reaction to other stim-
uli. For example, some words signal cooperativeness, whereas others signal 
antagonism. In one experiment, researchers used an identically structured 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game under different names: “Community 
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Game” and “Wall Street Game.” Participants reacted very differently, show-
ing higher levels of cooperativeness in the “Community Game” (Liberman 
et al. 2004). Humans also adapt their behavior to that of others, using a “do 
what the majority of peers do”-heuristic (Gigerenzer 2010, 539ff.). If others 
behave differently from what we think would be the right way to behave, 
this can create considerable discomfort – as was the case for the partici-
pants in Solomon E. Asch’s famous experiments, in which a group of people 
confidently gave wrong answers to simple questions (1951). The tendency 
to adapt to the behavior of others almost instinctively can also be used for 
misleading others about the game they are in. 
Being misled by being caught unaware is different from being misled be-
cause one does not know the rules of the game. Take the example of job ne-
gotiations and the shift from “will we hire you?” to “how much do we have 
to offer?” Often, there will be subtle cues, for example a shift in tone or the 
involvement of additional individuals, that allow experienced candidates to 
understand what is going on. He may not even actively register these cues as 
cues, but simply understand that he is now in a different game. An unexpe-
rienced candidate, in contrast, may not know the relevant norms of hiring 
processes, and therefore not capture these signals. 
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (e.g. 1986) has famously distin-
guished various forms of capital: economic capital in the conventional sense; 
social capital, i.e. membership in certain groups and access to networks; 
cultural capital, i.e. education and knowledge that allow individuals to act 
as cultural authorities; and symbolic capital, i.e. recognition, prestige, and 
trust from others. The possession of social and cultural capital can help in-
dividuals to get a better understanding of the games they are in, and makes 
it less likely that they can be misled about them. For example, they might 
be better able to notice subtle social cues that signal persistent conflicts of 
interests or a willingness to compromise. Candidates who lack social and 
cultural capital, in contrast, may not be able to anticipate such mechanisms 
and to catch the signals for a switch of games. They may therefore remain 
in a defensive mode in a succession of different games, and that may make 
it harder for them to defend their own interests.
While the examples I had discussed earlier mostly consisted of cases in which 
the act of misleading about the game was an intentional act, this last example 
illustrates that such acts can also happen unintentionally.4 Unintentional acts 
of misleading about the game can happen, for example, if someone simply 
cannot imagine that the other party would not understand certain signals. 
4  In this respect, misleading about the game is different from manipulation, which, as 
Baron (2014) convincingly argues, requires intent. 
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But the different games we participate in, and the different epistemic situ-
ations that arise within them, take place in societies that are vastly unequal 
and highly differentiated. Therefore, a signal that is completely obvious for 
individuals from one background may be unreadable for individuals from 
another background. Semi- or unconscious processes on the part of the per-
son who misleads may also play a role; for example, in the case of job nego-
tiations she may hold a semi-conscious view that if a candidate does not get 
the signals she sends, then this candidate does not “fit” into the company. 
A third dimension that helps to understand the variety of cases of mislead-
ing about the game concerns the question of who can define what the game 
is. In some situations, e.g. in the case of Anne and Bert, the opportunity to 
do so is symmetrical. Both parties are on a par in the sense that they jointly 
define the game, and both can switch to a different game – Bert could have 
tried to mislead Anne in the same way as Anne misled him. In other cases, 
one party asymmetrically defines the game, and the other party can either 
accept or reject this game, but cannot suggest a different game. In the job 
market, candidates usually cannot switch to the game of “how much do we 
have to offer?,” although if they have other offers they can switch to a game 
of “can you make me a better offer than others?”
Finally, one can also distinguish between malevolent and benevolent acts of 
misleading about the game. In “malevolent” cases the person who misleads 
others does so in order to further her own interests, at the costs of others’ 
interests. One can imagine, at least as a theoretical possibility and as a point 
of comparison, that someone does so in order to further the interests of the 
person she misleads. For example, a benevolent HR officer might want a 
certain candidate to be hired, but realizes that he might, out of naiveté and 
inexperience, demand far too high a salary. It would be better for the can-
didate if he did not push his luck too far. In such a situation, the HR officer 
could attempt to mislead the candidate about the game he is in, in order to 
prevent him from harming himself by making demands that are perceived 
as impertinent, which would lead to him not getting an offer at all. 
4 The wrongness of misleading about the game
How can we evaluate the phenomenon of misleading about the game from a 
normative perspective? Act consequentialism, which takes into account the 
interests of the individuals involved in concrete cases, does not get us very 
far, because all depends on the circumstances and the concrete constellation 
of interests. For example, if Anne’s company is under pressure and she might 
have to lay off employees if she does not get a good deal, it may seem justi-
fied to trick Bert into revealing the upper limit of his budget – unless there is 
some even weightier interest on his side. In a case of benevolent misleading, 
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there would not be any “moral remainder” from this perspective; a result 
many commentators would reject as implausible. Instead of act consequen-
tialism, I suggest three other normative angles that allow us to grasp what 
might be wrong about such cases, but also to distinguish between the dif-
ferent varieties of the phenomenon distinguished above.
4.1 Deontological constraints
A promising candidate for understanding what is wrong with acts of mis-
leading about the game, at least intentional ones, is the imperative to treat 
others with respect and not to use them as instruments of one’s own will, 
which creates deontological constraints on how we may treat them. The 
way in which Anne treated Bert implies that she put her own will and inter-
ests above his, not treating him as an independent agent worthy of respect. 
With regard to a similar constellation, the unilateral subversion of practices, 
Schapiro notes that what is problematic about it is that “it makes you end up 
serving a unilateral will” (2003, 345). This one-sidedness also characteriz-
es cases of being intentionally misled about the game one is in. They can be 
described as a form of manipulation in which the other person is not treat-
ed with the respect owed her as moral equal.5 This is morally problematic, 
no matter whether it is a case of catching others unawares or of playing on 
their ignorance; it seems wrong in symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cas-
es. It also explains why even in benevolent cases, there is a “moral remain-
der”: it remains the case that treating someone in this way expresses a lack 
of respect, even if this failure may be outweighed by good consequences. 
It is interesting to note that in many cases, the strategy of misleading others 
about the game cannot be revealed to them without destroying its effective-
ness. It could hardly be translated into a general law, in the sense of Kant’s 
categorical imperative, without undermining the conditions under which it 
5  In the philosophical debate, various suggestions have been put forward for how 
exactly to understand the wrongness of manipulation. For example, is deception a nec-
essary element, or is it necessary to address non-rational aspects of the object of manip-
ulation? (for an overview of the debate see Coons/Weber 2014, 9ff.). What unites differ-
ent cases of manipulation, as Coon and Weber argue, is that the manipulator (A) shows 
a lack of consideration for the object of manipulation (B) that cannot be generalized: 
when A influences B, she has “no regard for whether the influence makes sense to the 
manipulator were he or she the person being influenced” (ibid., 13, cf. similarly Gorin 
2014). This criterion is sufficiently general to also capture (at least some versions of) the 
phenomenon of misleading about the game. An important difference between manipu-
lation and misleading about the game, however, is that manipulation – at least as usual-
ly understood in the debate – concerns processes of reflection and the formation of 
preferences. Acts of misleading about the game do not “intrude” into an agent’s inner life, 
but rather set up a trap in her environment, which concerns the agent’s immediate be-
havior, not so much her processes of reflection and the formation of her preferences. 
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is possible to use it. If everyone tried to mislead others about the game they 
are in, the social norms on which such maneuvers rely would break down, 
just as the institution of a promise would break down if everyone broke 
their promises. 
The deontological constraint is especially plausible for ruling out cases of 
misleading about the game in which the other party was genuinely ignorant 
about the norms in question. For cases that play on lack of awareness, howev-
er, an objection might be raised: an argument from consent. It might be said 
that there are situations in which both parties agree, implicitly or explicitly, 
to treat one another not according to standards of complete openness and 
honesty, but to allow strategic behavior. This is more plausible when the sit-
uation is symmetrical, i.e. when both parties jointly define what the game is, 
but we can also imagine cases in which an individual consents to a situation 
that is unilaterally defined by another person, but in which strategic behav-
ior is permitted. Here, as in “the sound and the fury” phenomena discussed 
by Shapiro, one question is how to establish that genuine consent has been 
 given. It might be said that by initiating certain forms of social interaction, in-
dividuals agree to by their rules, and also agree to let others play by them. One 
might say that they have consciously and voluntarily entered a game (or me-
ta-game), e.g. “business negotiations,” that allows participants to use various 
tricks, including misleading about the game, once they are on the playing field. 
To be sure, there is something disingenuous about misleading others about 
the game they are in. It exploits our less-than-fully-rational nature: our ten-
dency to follow cues, to jump to conclusions, or to be swayed by the heat of 
the moment, e.g. by an intense discussion in which we jointly tackle technical 
problems. This happens to the overwhelming majority of people from time 
to time, and it seems not especially virtuous to abuse this tendency. None-
theless, it might be said that in certain situations, we simply have to be on 
guard, and if we behave less-than-fully-rationally, others cannot be blamed 
for taking advantage of this fact. Such arguments seem somewhat plausible 
for business contexts or legal contexts in which parties have conflicting inter-
ests. There has been some debate about the permissibility of deviating from 
everyday moral standards in such situations.6 For the sake of argument, we 
can assume that it is sometimes the case that by entering certain games, we 
implicitly agree to being treated in ways that would violate deontological 
constraints if they took place elsewhere. 
6  See e.g. Dees / Cramton (1991) on a “trust based” perspective on business ethics that 
argues that situations with trust, or in which trust can be built, need to be distinguished 
from other kinds of situations. For the context of law, Applebaum (1996, chap. 6), provides 
a discussion of the conditions under which “adversarial” behavior that deviates from 
everyday morality can be justified. As he argues, such deviations are possible, but the 
conditions for them to be legitimate are far more stringent than is often assumed.
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Some of the ambiguity about the case of Anne and Bert can be explained 
by the fact that we do not know whether or not implicit consent can be as-
sumed. Some might say that it was Bert who made a mistake by not being 
on guard. He should have kept in mind that the broader context was one of 
business negotiations, and should have been more careful not to reveal stra-
tegically important information. One can imagine different versions of the 
story in which this is more or less plausible. For example, Anne might have a 
reputation as a shrewd businesswoman, or it might be known that she fights 
tooth and nail to keep her company in business. In a different version, Anne 
and Bert might have cooperated before and some level of mutual trust might 
have developed between them, or they might work in an industry in which 
there are high standards of honesty and fair dealing. Depending on such de-
tails, it can be more or less plausible to blame Bert rather than Anne. What 
makes this more likely in the example of Anne and Bert is the fact that their 
relation is symmetrical: both jointly defined their situation, and both could 
try to play tricks on each other.
Thus, while consent can sometimes remove deontological constraints, the 
argument remains limited in scope. While there can be cases in which nor-
matively meaningful consent – i.e. fully informed, voluntary, and rational 
consent – can be presupposed, especially in symmetrical cases, this does not 
cover all cases. It rules out cases in which individuals genuinely could not 
expect that someone would mislead them about the game.7 It is important to 
note, however, that this argument is difficult to apply to cases of unintention-
al misleading about the game. If there is no intention to treat others instru-
mentally, it seems difficult to hold that a duty of respect has been violated 
– unless one postulates a duty to make sure that even unintentional acts of 
misleading about the game do not happen, so that a failure to do so is a case 
of culpable negligence. As we shall see, there are good reasons for doing so.
4.2 Free-riding on the cultural infrastructure 
Acts of misleading about the game blur the boundaries between games, 
or abruptly switch between different games, in ways that the other par-
ty does not expect. This is only possible against the background of social 
7  To take an extreme case: there have been reports about an undercover agent who 
started a romantic relationship with a woman in order to spy on her and her group of 
friends, who were environmental activists (http://www.theguardian.com/commentis-
free/2015/jul/28/relationships-undercover-officers-lies-mark-kennedy-police). When 
the woman discovered his true identity, the agent left in a hurry, leaving her devastated 
and deeply unsettled. In this case, there were probably many lies and deceptions involved 
– but we can imagine a scenario in which it happened without any direct lies, because 
most individuals do not explicitly ask their romantic interests whether they might be 
undercover agents, which means that direct lies might not be necessary.
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differentiation: in different social spheres, different social norms prevail. 
These social norms protect something valuable, namely the opportunity to 
live a life that contains different social games, with different epistemic sit-
uations. More specifically, what is protected is the ability to maintain some 
games in which we can trust others, rely on their words, and do not have to 
fully concentrate on opportunities that they might size in order to mislead 
us. Without social norms that single out certain situations as “trust games,” 
as it were, the default epistemic attitude would have to be the expectation 
that other individuals (maybe with the exception of close family members 
and friends) are epistemically non-cooperative, so that in order to protect 
our interests, we would, at any point in time, have to be maximally on guard.
When someone misleads another person about the game she is in, she free-
rides on these valuable social norms: she draws on them, but does not help 
maintain them. In order to be stable, social norms need reinforcement: most 
individuals, most of the time, need to obey them and sanction deviations, 
otherwise the norms can easily unravel. Nonetheless, it can be tempting 
for individuals to deviate from them for their own benefit. The situation 
has the structure of a prisoner’s dilemma: it is collectively rational to main-
tain these norms, but individually rational to deviate from them in order to 
pursue one’s own interests. One can condemn such free-riding from dif-
ferent moral perspectives: from a contractualist perspective, it violates the 
conditions of the possibility of certain forms of cooperation; from a (rule-
) consequentialist perspective it destroys opportunities for increasing total 
welfare. By postulating a duty not to mislead others about the game, we pre-
serve a cultural infrastructure that protects our interests even in situations 
in which we do not pay full attention, or do not know the subtleties of the 
social norms invoked. 
“So what?,” someone might say, “it’s a cold world out there. Why should I 
stick to these norms rather than pursue my own interests?” But the picture 
suggested by this remark is deeply at odds with what we know about human 
cognition and about the ways in which it depends on supporting structures 
in the external world. Human beings are not Cartesian egos, completely 
autonomous and independent of external support. Rather, they constantly 
use what philosophers of mind have called “scaffolding” in order to improve 
their cognitive and volitional capacities – from pen and paper for memoriz-
ing things, to maps or computer programs that help us find our way.8 As one 
scholar put it: “it is the human brain plus these chunks of external scaffold-
ing that finally constitutes the smart, rational inference engine we call mind” 
8  E.g. Clark 1996, 45. As he notes, the term has its roots in the work of Soviet psychol-
ogist Lev Vygotsky. 
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(Clark 1996, 180). We are embodied creatures, not Leipnizian monads, and 
we have adapted to a material and social world.
The cultural infrastructure that helps us to navigate the complex social world 
we live in can also be understood as a form of “scaffolding.” In some games, 
we trust others almost unconditionally; in others, we want to make sure 
that we possess the right level of alertness, and so on. If we know that there 
are some games in which we better not trust others too easily and which 
ones these are, we can prepare ourselves. For example, we might avoid such 
spheres when we have a headache and have trouble concentrating.
If we do not know which game we are in, however, we feel at a loss. We do 
not know how to behave and what level of alertness to exhibit. Sometimes, 
we may be able to creatively make up the rules of the game as we go along, 
especially if we are in symmetrical situations in which we can do so togeth-
er. But in many situations, there are preexisting asymmetries of power that 
make it hard or impossible to play a part in defining the rules of the game. 
Even if it turns out that we did not make any “mistakes” in the sense we have 
fallen into a trap set up by others, we are often stressed out by such situations. 
If we had to live with the constant fear that some individuals might trick 
us by blurring the boundaries of different games, this would make our lives 
very strenuous: we would always have to look out for signs that reassure us 
about the game we are in, in order to make sure that we are not being mis-
led. Social norms help us to decide when we are justified in letting our guard 
down and speak and act spontaneously, on the assumption that others will 
not exploit this fact. This is a collective achievement that is worth protecting. 
The maintenance of the cultural infrastructure that helps us differentiate 
between different spheres can be understood in analogy to the maintenance 
of an epistemic regime in which truthfulness is the norm. Williams provides 
a compelling genealogical account of why we should endorse such a norm, 
starting from the fact that human beings practice an “epistemic division of 
labor”: they pool information, relying on others for observations or other 
forms of knowledge that they have not acquired themselves (2002, 43f.). To 
do this successfully, Williams argues, the virtues of “accuracy” and “sincerity” 
are needed, to resist the temptations of “fantasy” and “wish” and the temp-
tation to avoid costly “investigative investments” in acquiring correct infor-
mation.9 In other words, the members of the group that Williams imagines 
need to overcome a prisoner’s dilemma: for each of them, it is easier not to 
make such investments and to free-ride on others contributing knowledge, 
but this is collectively irrational, as it leads, by assumption, to an underin-
vestment in the acquisition of knowledge. This is why we should endorse 
9  Ibid., chap. 5 and 6.
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the virtues of “accuracy” and “sincerity,” and why strong social norms against 
lying and misleading are appropriate. 
A parallel argument can be made for maintaining the cultural infrastructure 
of social norms that signal which game we are in: whether it is appropriate 
to trust one another or whether we need to be on guard, whether we can be 
spontaneous and share personal information or whether we need to factor 
in that it might be used against us. The fallback option, outside the circle of 
one’s close allies, is to be on guard as much as possible, so what these norms 
make possible is the creation of protected spaces in which we play different 
games, with higher degrees of trust and openness. Maintaining them, how-
ever, requires more than “accuracy” and “sincerity;” it also requires that we 
are open about the game we are in.10 This is why there is a moral remainder if 
we mislead others about the game they are in – even if, and especially when, 
we accept that there are some games, e.g. business negotiations, in which we 
do not have to be fully open. 
To be sure, not every single instance of free-riding contributes to the un-
dermining of a social norm. Many social norms are fuzzy around the edges 
and tolerate some violations. But violations, if left unsanctioned, can none-
theless have wider implications: norms can unravel because violations are 
perceived by others as signals that the norms are not valid. From a conse-
quentialist perspective, these can be described as “spirals,” in the sense of the 
term introduced by Jonathan Glover: actions can have “an influence on peo-
ple,” which is then “repeated” and thus snowballs into a larger effect (1975, 
179f.). While a contractualist would condemn acts of free-riding as wrong 
in themselves, a consequentialist would probably distinguish between cases 
in which such further effects are more or less likely. For example, if Anne’s 
behavior towards Bert is widely visible within their industry, and contributes 
to the destruction of beneficial norms of honesty and collegial collaboration, 
a consequentialist would evaluate this case differently from a one-off scenar-
io in which no one but Bert is affected. What is interesting to note, however, 
is that this perspective captures the wrongness not only of intentional, but 
also of unintentional acts of misleading about the game: an act of uninten-
tional misleading expresses a lack of attention to social norms that we all 
have a co-responsibility to protect, and can therefore also be morally wrong. 
10  This can be understood as an “other-directed epistemic virtue,” in the way in which 
de Bruin, for example, describes “epistemic generosity”: it helps others to acquire knowl-
edge (De Bruin 2015, 53ff.; see also Kawall 2002); sometimes it can also include genuine 
moral generosity if it allows others to better pursue their interests. But while such gen-
erosity is usually understood as addressing the person we are directly interacting with, 
honesty about the game one is in also protects a general good: the ability to maintain 
certain norms that we all benefit from. 
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4.3 Implicit discrimination
A third perspective from which to judge acts of misleading about the game 
asks who is most likely to be their victim. Many such manoeuvers will hit 
individuals randomly, especially those that try to catch us unaware.11 But we 
can nonetheless expect that the phenomenon reinforces existing inequalities 
in our societies. This is true in particular for versions that play on individ-
uals’ genuine ignorance of social norms. Individuals from different back-
grounds, e.g. along lines of gender, race, or class,12 have differential access to, 
and opportunities to internalize, knowledge about context-specific norms, 
for example the norms that govern job negotiations. This can lead to seri-
ous disadvantages, no matter whether a potential employer intentionally 
misleads them or whether she is simply inattentive to the applicant’s lack of 
understanding. This is particularly problematic when situations are asym-
metrical, with one party defining the game and the epistemic situation: if 
the other party lacks relevant social and cultural capital, it is very likely that 
she ends up in a position in which it is hard or impossible for her to defend 
her legitimate interests. 
Most individuals are more likely to share knowledge with individuals with 
similar socio-economic characteristics, i.e. family members or friends. This 
creates a structural asymmetry can coexist with formally equal conditions. 
Acts of intentional or unintentional misleading about the game can take place 
without any direct discrimination against atypical candidates. The kind of 
social knowledge they need to move smoothly through, say, job negotia-
tions, can be difficult to acquire if one has not acquired it during one’s ear-
ly socialization, because so much of it is implicit. Even if it can be acquired 
later in life – for example by reading guidebooks on how job negotiations 
work – there is still an asymmetry between those who acquire it automat-
ically and without effort, and those who have to carry costs, both literally 
and metaphorically, to acquire it. These additional costs make it harder for 
“outsiders” to pursue their interests. To be sure, acts of misleading about 
the game are not the only phenomenon that plays a role in explaining their 
11  However, in a discussion of manipulation, Cholbi (2014) argues that “ego depletion,” 
i.e. the phenomenon that self-control can be depleted, is an important factor for under-
standing poverty, because poor individuals often have to exercise a high degree of 
self-control and are therefore more vulnerable to manipulators. Similarly, exercising 
self-control needed for remaining attentive to the cues that define the epistemic situation 
is probably more difficult for individuals who have to exercise self-control in many 
other areas as well, which is more likely for poor and disadvantaged individuals. 
12  These run along similar, but not necessarily identical, lines as those analyzed in 
Fricker’s (2007) account of epistemic injustice. It seems likely that these phenomena 
often go together.
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disadvantaged position. But it is one worth noting, if only it is usually too 
subtle to be grasped by the tools of legal regulation. 
Our complex social world with its various social games and epistemic situ-
ations, which may look like a wonderful playing field full of opportunities 
for various kinds of interactions to those familiar with the social norms, can 
look very unfriendly to those who have trouble understanding these norms. 
What is helpful social scaffolding for those who can read the signals, can be a 
dangerous trap for those who cannot. Moving in spheres in which one fears 
being misled about the game can require a lot of energy. It might be one of 
the reasons for why individuals from atypical backgrounds are reluctant to 
enter certain social spheres at all. It is safer to stick to the games one is fa-
miliar with, which one can play on an equal footing, than to enter games in 
which the rules are set by others, and in which one fears getting caught in a 
trap. If this is the case, the phenomenon compromises basic norms of equal-
ity of opportunity.
We can think about a version of the story of Anne and Bert in which these 
additional factors have to be considered for arriving at a correct moral eval-
uation. Assume, for example, that Bert is a newcomer in the industry, maybe 
the first member of his family to have gone to college and to have gotten a 
professional job. He may have had few opportunities for mentoring or net-
working in order to “learn the ropes.” In this case, it seems far more prob-
lematic that Anne plays her trick of asking strategic questions in unexpected 
moments, and Bert could rightly complain about it. 
But what if Bert is a really street-smart guy and manages to play such a trick 
on Anne, who – by assumption – is in a well-established, privileged posi-
tion? We may have some sympathy with the clever underdog who manag-
es to outwit privileged individuals in order to pursue his interests, and we 
may also have some sympathies with such a person misleading others about 
the game they are in. But we could still hold that this behavior is wrong in 
a pro tanto sense, and that our sympathy can be explained by other factors 
that outweigh this wrongness. In fact, I venture the guess that our sympathy 
stems from the fact that we instinctively assume that normally, the situation 
is reversed – normally, it is the underdog who is misled about the game he is 
in. Maybe it is the very fact that an underdog can sometimes beat his oppo-
nents at their own game that makes us feel a vicarious triumph in such cases. 
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have discussed the phenomenon of misleading about the game 
you are in, which is different from lies or acts of misleading by implication. 
I have analyzed its wrongness in terms of a violation of a duty of respect, 
267
SOCIAL JUSTICE: NEW PERSPECTIVES, NEW HORIZONS 
at least when the other party has not consented to such treatment, in terms 
of undermining the cultural infrastructure of social norms that demarcate 
different spheres in which different games are played, and in terms of dis-
crimination against atypical candidates. In this concluding section, let me 
briefly comment on some practical implications that can be drawn from 
these reflections.
Like many other phenomena of deception and discrimination, the phenom-
enon of misleading about the game draws on subtleties that lie below the ra-
dar of formal regulation. This should not surprise us: this phenomenon has 
to do both with informal social norms and, at least in some versions, with 
less-than-fully-rational behavioral tendencies, the effects of which are high-
ly context-dependent. This is why approaches beyond the law are required 
to address the problem: we have to find other ways of changing the norms 
that make it possible, and of holding others morally accountable where we 
cannot hold them legally accountable. This seems particularly relevant in the 
labor market, which plays a crucial role for the distribution of opportunities, 
resources, power, and influence in our societies. Take the example of an HR 
officer who interviews job candidates, some of whom come from disadvan-
taged backgrounds. Misleading them about the game they are in can be a way 
of letting them appear unqualified in comparison to other candidates. This 
can probably be done in ways that would not violate any formal norms of 
non-discrimination, and would hence be difficult to capture in legal terms. 
This means that they have to be countered in different ways.
We can here draw on a proposal recently brought forward by de Bruin in 
the context of applied epistemology (2015, chap. 7). He develops the ideal of 
“interlucency” for describing epistemic situations in which the sender and 
the recipient of information mutually support one another in making sure 
that they successfully share knowledge, for example by providing feedback 
on how they understand certain points or by granting requests to repeat or 
clarify issues. As de Bruin describes it, “[t]he recipient has to acknowledge 
receipt of the message and must try to make clear how she understands the 
message. Both sender and recipient have to contribute to sufficient open-
ness concerning the communication and interpretation strategies they use 
in order that epistemic generosity gets off the ground” (2015, 163). Similar-
ly, partners in conversation can make clear to one another which game and 
which epistemic situation they are in. If one party thinks that the other party 
violates the rules applying to this epistemic situation, it should be possible to 
pause the conversation and to move to a meta-level, in order to discuss what 
is going on. This seems all the more important the more “strategic” these 
games are. If such games are justifiable at all, it is essential to make sure that 
all parties know what they are up to. 
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Another lesson to draw from the analysis of the phenomenon of misleading 
about the game is the need for mentoring and acculturation in order to en-
able atypical candidates to enter games that had hitherto been inaccessible 
for them. Mentoring and acculturation through personal networks can help 
candidates to understand the games that are being played in different social 
spheres. This enables them to participate in them on a more equal footing, 
rather than being vulnerable to all kinds of intentional or unintentional acts 
of misleading. Misleading others about the game they are in can be a tool 
for maintaining unjust privileges, while mentorship and networks can be in-
struments for strengthening individuals to storm these bastions. But in many 
instances of the phenomenon we can probably also defend a duty of those 
who are in a position of power or act as gatekeepers nzot to mislead others 
about the game they are in, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Thus, 
with regard to the social discrimination that can happen by misleading others 
about the game they are in, an ethos of justice is needed. But this should not 
surprise us: if social norms are powerful tools for protecting privilege, chang-
ing them is of paramount importance for creating a more just society as well.
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Liza Hercog
Igra u kojoj si: obmanjivanje kroz socijalne norme  
i šta je pogrešno u vezi sa tim
Apstrakt
U članku se razmatra fenomen obmanjivanja u vezi sa „igrom u kojoj jesi“. Indi-
vidue koje na ovaj način obmanjuju druge iskorišćavaju činjenicu da se oslanja-
mo na socijalne norme pri regulisanju stepena opreznosti, otvorenosti i povere-
nja, koje upotrebljavamo u različitim epistemičkim situacijama. Pretvarajući se 
da učestvuju u izvesnoj igri sa izvesnom epistemičkom situacijom, oni mogu pri-
mamiti druge da otkriju informaciju ili da pokažu manje stepene obazrivosti, time 
idući protiv sopstvenih interesa. Razgraničavam ovaj fenomen od neposredne 
laži i implicitnih činova obmane, i razmatram neke njegove varijacije. Potom pi-
tam zašto i pod kojim uslovima je moralno pogrešno obmanjivati druge o igri u 
kojoj jesu. Razlikujem tri normativna ugla za razumevanje tog fenomena: deon-
tološka ograničenja, iskorišćavanje zajedničke kulturne infrastrukture i implicitnu 
diskriminaciju stranaca i atipičnih aspiranata. Zaključujem kratkim raspravljanjem 
nekih praktičnih implikacija.
Ključne reči: epistemičke situacije, laganje, obmana, socijalne norme
